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Numerous studies on firm-level data have reported higher average wages in foreign-
owned firms than in domestically-owned firms. This, however, does not necessarily 
imply  that  the  individual  worker’s  wage  increase  with  foreign  ownership.  Using 
detailed  matched  employer-employee  data  on  the  entire  Swedish  private  sector,  we 
examine the effect of foreign ownership on individual wages, controlling for individual 
and firm heterogeneity as well as for possible selection bias in foreign acquisitions. We 
distinguish  between  foreign  greenfields  and  takeovers  and  compare  foreign  owned 
firms  with  both  domestic  multinationals  and  local  firms.  Our  results  show  a 
considerably smaller wage premium in foreign owned firms than what has been found 
in studies conducted at a more aggregate level. Moreover, foreign takeovers of Swedish 
firms tend to have no or even a negative effect on wages.   
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1. Introduction 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has increased dramatically during the last decades and 
has arguably benefited both host and home countries. The former group of countries 
may  for  instance  benefit  through  inflows  of  new  technology  and  access  to  foreign 
markets. An additional benefit could be a positive effect on host country wages. It is 
well established that foreign owned firms pay higher average wages than domestically 
owned firms.
1 Part of this wage premium is caused by foreign firms locating in high 
wage sectors and localities, but the premium exists even within industries and regions 
and after controlling for firm characteristics and the average educational level of the 
labor force. There are several suggestions why foreign firms would pay higher wages 
than  domestic  firms.  For  instance,  foreign  firms  might  try  to  prevent  technological 
spillovers through labor turnover by paying a wage premium (Fosfuri et al., 2001); the 
wage  premium  might  be  caused  by  rent-sharing  arrangements among  foreign  firms 
(Budd et al., 2005); by compensation for a higher labor demand volatility in foreign 
plants (Fabri et al., 2003); or for a higher foreign closure rate (Bernard and Sjöholm, 
2003).  
However, although the average wage is relatively high in foreign owned firms, 
it is still unclear if foreign firms pay higher wages for identical workers. Employees 
differ in many respects such as age, education, gender and previous work experience, 
all of which have an impact on wages. It is plausible that the foreign wage premium is 
caused by such characteristics rather than by ownership of the firm. To examine if 
                                                            
1 See e.g. Aitken et al. (1996), Bandick (2004), Conyon et al. (2002), Doms and Jensen (1998), Driffield 
and Girma (2002), Girma et al. (2001), Griffith (1999), Görg et al. (2002), Haddad and Harrison, (1993), 
Lipsey (1994), Lipsey and Sjöholm (2004), and Sjöholm and Lipsey (2006). In these studies the wage 
differentials between domestically- and foreign-owned firms range from about 10 to 70 percent. See also 
Lipsey (2004) for a survey of the literature on FDI and wages.   3 
foreign firms pay a relatively high wage for a given quality of employees calls for a 
change in the unit of observation: from the firm or plant level to the individual worker. 
In addition, to control for differences in human capital, detailed information on worker 
characteristics is necessary. The importance of such analysis has been shown in work 
on international trade and wages  (see e.g.  Gaston and  Trefler,  1994; Goldberg and 
Pavcnik,  2005,  and  Kaplan  and  Verhoogen,  2006)  but  few  studies  use  matched 
employer-employee data to examine the effect of FDI on wages. One exception is a 
study  by  Martins  (2004),  who  find  no  effect  on  individual  wages  after  foreign 
acquisition of Portuguese manufacturing firms.  
This paper combines data on all Swedish firms spanning the period 1990-2000 
with a large sample of more than 2 million Swedish employees covering the period 
1996-2000.  We  contribute  to  the  literature  in  several  respects.  First,  our  matched 
employer-employee  data  enable  us  to  analyze  the  impact  of  foreign  ownership  on 
individual wages, controlling for both firm- and individual heterogeneity. In order to 
control for unobservable firm and individual characteristics as well as for a possible 
selection  bias  in  foreign  acquisitions,  we  combine  propensity  score  matching 
techniques with the more general difference in difference estimator. Second, foreign 
owned  firms  might  enter  the  market  by  a  greenfield  investment  or  through  an 
acquisition of a Swedish owned firm. These two modes of entry might have different 
effects on wages. We therefore compare foreign greenfield investments with foreign 
acquisitions. Third, to control for the impact of being a multinational firm we compare 
foreign owned firms with both Swedish multinational firms and Swedish local firms.  
In  accordance  with  the  previous  literature,  firm  level  regressions  show  that 
foreign  owned  firms  pay  higher  wages  than  domestically  owned  firms.  This  wage 
premium is primarily due to differences between foreign owned firms and Swedish   4 
local firms, suggesting that multinationality – not nationality - is important. Comparing 
greenfields with foreign takeovers indicates that greenfields tend to pay the highest 
wage premium.  
The estimated wage premium in foreign owned firms is substantially reduced as 
we  change  from  firm  to  individual  level  estimations.  Estimating  individual  wage 
equations yields a coefficient for foreign ownership that is close to zero. Finally, results 
from  combined  matching  and  difference-in-differences  estimations  show  that  the 
individual worker’s wage level is 2-6 percent higher in acquired than in similar non-
acquired firms, but that wage growth is lower in acquired firms. This result is verified 
further by fixed-effect estimations, which suggest a slight negative impact on individual 
wages from foreign takeovers of Swedish firms. 
The paper is organized as follows. The following section describes the data and 
provides descriptive statistics. The empirical methodology is presented in Section III. 
The results are presented in Section IV. Finally, Section V concludes.  
  
2. Data Sources and Description  
2.1 Data  
The analysis is based on three register-based data sets from Statistics Sweden. First, the 
financial statistics data (FS) contains detailed information on all Swedish firms for the 
period 1996-2000. For the period 1990-1995 we have data on all manufacturing firms 
with at least 20 employees and non-manufacturing firms with at least 50 employees.
2 A 
large number of variables are included such as value added, capital stock (book value), 
                                                            
2 We have a stratified random sample for non-manufacturing firms with less than 50 employees. Data on 
financial sector firms is not available.   5 
number of employees, total wages, ownership, profits, sales and industry affiliation. A 
detailed description of the variables is found in Tables A1- A3 in the Appendix. 
Second, the Regional labor market statistics (RAMS) includes data on all plants 
spanning the period 1990-2000. RAMS add plant information on the composition of the 
labor force with respect to educational level and age structure.
3  
Finally,  the  individual  wage  statistics  database  (LS)  contains  detailed 
information from official registers on a very large representative sample of employed 
individuals. The individual wage statistics is based on Statistics Sweden’s annual salary 
survey and is supplemented by material from a series of official data registers. The LS 
spans  the  period  1996-2000  and  includes  information  on  approximately  2  million 
observations  per  year,  which  is  roughly  50  percent  of  the  Swedish  labor  force. 
Examples of variables included are full-time equivalent wages, education, labor market 
experience, gender, and job type.
4 
The data sets are matched by unique identification codes. The nature of the data 
sets implies that the firm-level estimations will be based on data for 1990-2000, while 
the individual-level analysis is based on our matched employer-employee data set for 
the period 1996-2000 using firms with at least 20 employees.  
                                                            
3 The plant level data is aggregated to the firm level. 
4 The sampling frame of the survey consists of firms that are included in Statistics Sweden’s firm data 
base (FS). A representative sample of firms is drawn from FS, stratified according to industry affiliation 
and firm size (number of employees). The sample size consists of between 8,000 and 11,000 firms for the 
period 1996-2000. The Central Confederation of Private Employers then provides employee information 
to Statistics Sweden on all its member firms that have (i) at least ten employees and (ii) are included in 
the sample. Firms with at least 500 employees are examined with probability one. The final sample 
includes information on around 50 percent of all employees within the entire private sector. 
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In the firm-level panel, spanning the period 1990-2000, we restrict our sample 
in most estimations to firms observed for at least five years. Moreover, for Swedish 
firms acquired by a foreign owner at period (t), we only consider firms that are Swedish 
owned at (t-1) and remain foreign owned at year (t+1) through (t+3).  
We make similar restrictions in most of the individual-level analysis on matched 
data for 1996-2000. For this analysis we only consider firms that are observed for four 
consecutive years. With this restriction we can study firms that are acquired 1997 or 
1998.  We  make  the  same  survival  criterion  for  the  control  group  of  non-acquired 
Swedish firms. As for firms, we restrict our sample of individuals to those who remain 
in the same firm during the period of observation of the firm. This restriction enables us 
to control for both individual and firm-specific effects when analyzing the impact of 
foreign ownership on wages. It also means that we do not have to be concerned about 
the  issue  of  endogenous  job  switchers,  implying  that  part  of  an  estimated  foreign 
ownership effect can be due to individuals switching firms through e.g. promotions, 
which in turn have a separate impact on wages.  
To distinguish between different types of firms, we divide our sample into three 
groups: foreign-owned MNCs, locally-owned MNCs, and locally-owned non-MNCs. A 
firm is a foreign-owned MNC if, according to information in the financial statistics, 
more than 50 percent of the equity is foreign owned. We define a locally-owned MNC 
as a firm reporting positive exports to other firms within the corporation. Finally, firms 
reporting no such exports are classified as locally-owned non-MNCs.
5 
 
                                                            
5 Export information is available for firms with at least 50 employees or smaller firms with large sales. 
There might exist a few small multinationals that are classified as local firms, due to missing information   7 
2.2 Descriptive Statistics 
There was a substantial increase of foreign ownership in the Swedish economy during 
the first half of the 1990s. The share of employees in foreign owned firms in the private 
sector increased from about 9 percent 1990 to roughly 13 percent 1996 and 18 percent 
1999 (ITPS, 2005).  
The increased foreign presence corresponds to similar developments in many 
other countries, but might have been comparably large in Sweden (e.g. OECD, 2001). 
There are several reasons for this development. For instance, the deregulation of capital 
and foreign exchange markets in the late 1980s opened up Sweden for inflows of FDI. 
Two other important factors include the Swedish membership in the European Union in 
1995 and the large currency crisis in 1992. The latter event reduced the cost of Swedish 
assets and the cost of locating production in Sweden.  
Table 1 shows a comparison of domestic- and foreign owned firms in Sweden. 
Wages are about 20 percent higher in foreign than in domestically owned Swedish 
firms.  Foreign  firms  locating  in  high-wage  sectors  do  not  seem  to  cause  the  high 
foreign wage; foreign owned firms pay higher wages in all sectors in 1990 and in all 
sectors except in Electronics and Transport Equipment in 2000.  
 
      -Table 1 about here- 
 
The higher wages in foreign-owned firms might be caused by firm characteristics. For 
instance, skilled individuals have comparably high wages, and large firms tend to pay 
higher wages than small firms.  Table 1 includes comparison of these factors in foreign- 
                                                                                                                                                                         
on exports. The potential bias is likely to be slight, but it presumably means that the difference between 
MNCs and non-MNCs could be slightly larger than suggested in Section V.   8 
and domestically-owned firms. High skill is measured as the share of the workforce 
with at least tertiary education and size as the number of employees. Foreign-owned 
firms  have  a  relatively  well-educated  workforce;  the  share  of  workers  with  higher 
education is twice as high as in domestically owned firm in 1990, but decreases to 
about 70 percent higher in 2000. The pattern of comparable skilled workers in foreign-
owned firms is found in almost all sectors and in both years. Moreover, foreign-owned 
firms are larger than domestically owned firms, and the difference has increased over 
the period. However, there are differences between industries and across the two years 
 
III. Empirical Set-Up 
Firm-level analysis  
We begin our analysis by examining the effect of ownership on wages at the firm level 
starting from the following expression: 
jt t j jt jt jt O w e l h b b b + + + ¢ + + = 2 1 0 F ln         (1) 
where wjt is the average wage in firm j at time t. Ownership is captured by O, a dummy 
variable for foreign ownership, defined as 1 if at least 50 percent of the equity is foreign 
owned.
6  We will analyze the stock of foreign owned firms, foreign takeovers, as well 
as  greenfield  investments.
7  To  control  for  the  impact  of  multinational  status,  we 
compare  foreign  owned  firms  with  both  Swedish  multinationals  and  Swedish  local 
                                                            
6 Statistics Sweden uses the internationally common 50 percent cut-off in defining foreign ownership. 
We are not able to study whether results are sensitive to this definition. However, other authors have 
examined the issue (see e.g. Martins (2004) and Barbosa and Louri (2002)). These studies do not find 
results to be sensitive to cut-off values. 
7 We define a greenfield investment as a newly established firm that is foreign owned. A firm is 
classified as new if it has a new organization number.    9 
firms. F is a vector of firm level variables such as (log) firm size, profits per employee, 
capital intensity, export intensity, categorical variables capturing the educational level 
of  the  employees,  share  of  female  employees,  labor  productivity  and  industry 
affiliation. Finally, lt, and ￿j are fixed time- and firm-effects, respectively, and ejt is the 
error term. 
 
Individual-level analysis  
We continue with estimates of individual wage equations using a panel of matched firm 
and individual level data.
8 Micro data on individuals allows us to take into account 
within  firm  variation  and  worker  heterogeneity.  We  use  the  following  empirical 
specification in the individual-level analysis: 
ijt t j i jt ijt jt O ijt w e l h a b b b b + + + + ¢ + ¢ + + = 3 F 2 X 1 0 ln        (2) 
where wijt is the full-time equivalent monthly wage for worker i in firm j  at time t; O is 
a  foreign  ownership  dummy  for  firm  j;  X  is  a  vector  of  individual  characteristics 
including gender, education, labor market experience and job-type; and F contains firm 
level  variables.  Finally,  ￿i,  lt,  and  ￿j  are  fixed  individual-,  time-  and  firm-effects, 
respectively, and eijt is the error term. 
 
Propensity score matching and difference-in-difference 
One problem with estimating the causal effect of an acquisition on wages is the possible 
endogeneity of firms being acquired. It is not likely to be random which firms are 
acquired and acquired firms might exhibit characteristics that systematically differ from 
non-acquired firms. Hence, similar to the problem of non-random treatment groups in 
                                                            
8 See e.g. Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) for techniques on matched data.   10 
the evaluation literature, firms that become foreign owned might  be such that  they 
would in any case develop differently than their non-acquired counterparts. This means 
that estimates on outcome variables (such as wages) become biased if non-randomness 
is not taken into account.  
One often used approach to control for selection-bias is to use an instrumental 
variable approach (IV). However, instrumental variables are arguably difficult in the 
context of FDI and wages, since most variables that affect foreign acquisitions also 
affects wages (see e.g. Girma and Görg (2006), and Sjöholm and Lipsey (2006)).
9 We 
therefore use an alternative and arguably preferable method, which is propensity score 
matching  (PSM)  combined  with  the  more  general  difference-in-differences  (d-i-d) 
technique,  as  suggested  by  e.g.  Blundell  and  Costa  Dias  (2005).  The  aim  of  the 
matching procedure is  to find a group of non-acquired firms that  display  the  same 
characteristics as the group of acquired firms. 
The  matching  procedure  can  be  described  as  follows.  Let  AÎ{T,C}  be  an 
acquisition indicator equal to T for firms being acquired (the treatment  group) and 
equal to C for firms that are not acquired (the control group).
T
s t k w + ,  denotes the wage at 
time t+s for a firm k that has been acquired at time t, and 
C
s t k w + ,  is the wage that would 
have  been  observed  if  the  firm  had  not  been  acquired.  Obviously,  no  firm  can  be 
                                                            
9 More specifically, IV estimations require instruments that are highly correlated with the variable of 
interest – foreign ownership or foreign takeovers – but uncorrelated with the dependent variable – wages. 
It is often very difficult to find such instruments (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000). Furthermore, Bound et 
al. (1995) points out that if the instruments are weekly correlated with the endogenous variable, then 
even a weak correlation between the instruments and the error term in the original equation may lead to a 
larger inconsistency in the IV-estimates than a simple OLS estimation. 
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observed in two different states at the same time, so either 
T
s t k w + ,  or 
C
s t k w + ,  is missing for 
each firm k. This fundamental problem of causal inference is sometimes described as 
the  evaluation  problem  of  missing  data.  However,  under  certain  assumptions,  the 




s t = - + +  




s t = - = = + + .  Matching techniques can be used to construct a 
sample of non-acquired twin firms to acquired firms and, thus, approximate the non-
observed counterfactual event in the last term.  
The  underlying  identifying  assumption  behind  matching  is  that  treatment 
participation and treatment outcome is independent, conditional on a set of observable 
characteristics. This assumption is called conditional independence (CIA), also known 
as  “selection  on  observables”.  The  CIA  implies  that  treatment  status  is  random 
conditional on a set of observed attributes X. In our notation, the CIA is given by (w
C, 
w
T) ^ A  X.
10 The plausibility of the non-testable CIA depends on the richness of the 
available data as discussed by e.g. Gerfin and Lechner (2002) and Sianesi (2004). Our 
detailed data-set is in this respect very useful. 
To  identify  the  treatment  effect,  the  so  called  balancing  property  of  the 
propensity score must also be fulfilled. This assumption is given by A  ^ X  p(X), 
where  p(X)  is  the  propensity  score.  This  means  that  observations  with  the  same 
                                                            
10 For the average effect of treatment on the treated, a weaker version of CIA is given by w
C ^ A | X. 
Note that CIA is stronger than necessary. It is sufficient to identify mean effects given by E(w
C  | X, 
A=T) = E(w
C  | X, A=C), called conditional mean independence.   12 
propensity score must have the same distribution of characteristics, independently of 
treatment status.
11 
The matching procedure in this paper uses the algorithms provided by Becker 
and  Ichino  (2002)  and  Leuven  and  Sianesi  (2003).  We  use  the  Nearest-Neighbor 
without replacement method. In a first step, we calculate the probability of a firm being 
acquired by foreign owners, using a number of observable characteristics. Each treated 
(acquired) firm is then matched by an “identical” but non-treated (non-acquired) firm. 
The  balancing  property  of  the  propensity  score  is  tested  and  satisfied  in  all 
estimations.
12  We  have  estimated  numerous  propensity  scores  using  a  variety  of 
covariates but have only considered those that satisfy the balancing property of the 
propensity score. Our choice of specification was based on high R
2.  
Table  A4  shows  the  estimated  logit-model  of  being  acquired  by  a  foreign 
owner,  conditional  on  a  variety  of  covariates  that  are  important  in  explaining 
acquisitions. Since there is no common agreement in the literature on the determinants 
                                                            
11 Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that treated and non-treated observations with the same propensity 
score are on average observationally identical, implying that exposure to treatment is random. In other 
words,  the  balancing  property  ensures  that  sufficiently  good  matches  are  found  for  all  treated 
observations. 
12  The  test  examines  treated  and  non-treated  observations  in  different  sub-samples  (blocks)  of 
observations. The number of blocks is determined by data and the estimated score. Within these intervals, 
the algorithm tests that the means of the covariates in the logit do not differ between treated and control 
observations. In testing the balancing property, only observations in the region of common support are 
included. The optimal number of blocks is found to be 2 for 1997 and 3 for 1998. We assume that all 
important differences between the groups of treated and non-treated observations are captured by their 
observable characteristics (CIA). 
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of foreign acquisitions we have been flexible in our choice of covariates. In the first-
step logit model that determines the probability of being acquired by a foreign owner 
we have used a large number of independent variables available in our data. These 
variables have all been mentioned in the literature as being important in explaining 
foreign ownership. We did also try to include further moments of firms’ characteristics. 
These are, however, not significant and had no impact on the fit of the specification. 
Since  we  have  a  panel  of  firms  and  individuals  observed  over  time,  the 
matching  of  firms  is  implemented  year-by-year  using  lagged  covariates.  Having 
obtained  a  control  group  of  firms,  we  then  proceed  to  estimate  the  impact  of 
acquisitions on individual wages by means of combining propensity score matching 
with  the  difference-in-difference  estimator.  This  means  that  we  can  examine  the 
dynamic  effects  of  takeovers  on  wages.  The  difference-in-difference  approach 
compares  wage  changes  for  the  treated  group  of  acquired  firms  with  the  relevant 
control  group  of  firms  that  are  not  acquired.  This  amounts  to 








s t w w w w - - - = + + j , where j is the unknown d-i-d parameter. 
The  d-i-d  estimator  will  be  estimated  from  the  following  individual  wage 
equation using data on acquired firms and non acquired twin firms: 
 
ijt t ij ijt jt T After i w e h d b + + + = ln            ) 3 (  
  
where 
ijt After  is a dummy variable that is equal to one for the periods after the firm has 
been acquired, and zero otherwise. T is a fixed acquisition (group) effect that is equal to 
one  if  the  firm  belongs  to  the  treatment  group,  and  zero  otherwise.  This  dummy 
variable captures differences in wage levels between acquired and non-acquired firms   14 
before the acquisition. The time effect  t h  captures aggregate period effects that are 
common between the two groups. The estimated d-i-d effect of an acquisition for wages 
is given by b. All estimated regressions include the same set of individual, firm and 
industry controls as in equation (2). 
 
IV. Results 
Firm-level Analysis  
We follow the previous literature and start by examining average wage per employee at 
the firm level in Table 2.  
 
      -Table 2 about here- 
 
Estimation 1 shows that wages are 20 percent higher in foreign-owned firms 
compared to wages in domestically owned firms, even after controlling for industry and 
time effects. In all estimations we include 14 industry dummies that are closely related 
to  the  different  bargaining  areas  in  the  Swedish  labor  market.  Using  a  more 
disaggregated industry classification with 50 dummies, not shown, leads to a minor 
decrease in the foreign wage premium, suggesting that some of the premium is caused 
by  a  different  sector  distribution  of  foreign  and  local  firms.  Estimation  2  includes 
characteristics of the workforce that presumably affect wages: the average skill level of 
employees and the share of female workers. Including these characteristics increases 
the R-square value substantially and reduces the wage premium in foreign owned firms 
to about 11 percent. Moreover, a high share of female workers decreases average wages   15 
and  a  high  share  of  high-skilled  workers  has  a  positive effect  on average  wages.
13 
Estimation 3 includes a set of other firm characteristics that have been found to affect 
wages  in  previous  studies.  Large  firms  pay  relatively  high  wages,  as  do  capital-
intensive firms. The coefficient for profits per employee is positive and statistically 
significant but of rather small size.  
In estimation 4, both human-capital and firm characteristics are included. The 
estimated coefficient on the foreign ownership variable of 0.105 is close to identical to 
the one in column 2.  
Estimations  5  and  6  compare  foreign-owned  firms  with  domestically-owned 
multinationals and local firms. The results show that the difference is much smaller 
between foreign-owned and domestically-owned multinationals than between foreign-
owned and local firms. Hence, a large part of the difference in wages between foreign- 
and domestically-owned firms is explained by multinational status alone.
14  
In estimation 7 we include a number of other factors that might affect wages: 
the firm’s export orientation, the degree of market competition, and labor productivity. 
Export  and  productivity  have  statistically  significant  coefficients  but  the  economic 
significance is small. Including all control variables in estimation 7 reduces the wage 
premium in foreign owned firms from 10.5 to about 9.4 percent, which is broadly in 
line with estimates in previous studies on firm level data for developed countries.
15 
Estimation 8 is conducted on the sub-period 1996-2000. This is to enable a 
comparison  with  individual  level  estimations  below  that  is  available  only  for  this 
period. Results remain robust with respect to the change in time period.  
                                                            
13 The group of comparison for the two skill variables is workers with intermediate skills (upper 
secondary education). 
14 See Bellak (2004) and Doms and Jensen (1998) for a similar discussion.   16 
When estimating the impact of foreign ownership on wages, weighting all firms 
equally may be improper. Swedish (local) and foreign firms are distributed differently 
over size categories, and firms of different sizes tend to pay different wages. More 
precisely, large firms tend to pay relatively high wages and multinational firms (foreign 
and domestic) tend to be relatively large. Weighing observations by size will increase 
the importance of large firms. Hence, we would expect weighting of the observations 
by  firm  size  to  reduce  the  foreign  ownership  wage  premium  since  it  reduces  the 
influence of small local (low-wage) firms. Indeed, we find that weighting observations 
by  employment  reduce  the  foreign  ownership  wage  premium  from  11  percent  in 
estimation 4 to 7 percent in estimation 9.
16 
One might argue that the imposed firm survival restriction bias the sample and 
thereby the results. We relax the survival restriction in estimation 10. The number of 
observations increases with roughly 50 percent but affect the results only marginally 
(compare model 10 and 4 in Table 2).
17 Moreover, in Table A2 and Table A3 we show 
how  various  restrictions  affect  sample  means.  The  overall  impression  is  that  the 
imposed restrictions have a small impact on sample means.
18  
                                                                                                                                                                         
15 See footnote 1 for references. 
16 The foreign wage premiums are 0.030 and 0.082 compared to Swedish MNEs and local Swedish firms 
respectively (not shown). Other studies do not apply firm size weighting techniques, which prevent a 
comparison with these previous studies. 
17 The foreign wage premium compared to Swedish MNEs and local Swedish firms are 0.034 and 0.136 
respectively (not shown).     
18 Table A2 includes descriptive statistics for the linked employer-employee data set with the previously 
discussed restrictions on survival rates and job switching. The second part of Table A2 includes statistics 
on all firms, not only those where we have information on individual employees. Finally, Table A3 
relaxes restrictions on survival rates and job switching. The overall impression is that our survival 
restrictions, linking, and choice of time period affect the results only marginally.   17 
Foreign firms enter Sweden either by setting up a greenfield investment or by 
acquiring  an  existing  Swedish-owned  firm.  It  may  not  be  obvious  why  a  foreign 
acquisition  should  raise  wages  for  workers  that  are  already  employed  in  the  firm, 
whereas a greenfield investor must attract new workers to the firm. One way to attract 
workers is to offer high wages. Moreover, a  greenfield  investor  might  pay a wage 
premium due to a lack of knowledge about the local labor market. In Table 3, we 
present wage  regressions where  foreign  ownership has been divided  into  greenfield 
investments and foreign takeovers of Swedish firms. An additional benefit with this 
distinction is that using foreign takeovers allows us to control for unobservable effects. 
If  high  wages  in  foreign  owned  firms  were  caused  by  unobservable  firm  specific 
characteristics,  rather  than  by  ownership  itself, we  would  not  expect  any  statistical 
significant effect of foreign takeovers.  
 
      -Table 3 about here- 
 
The wage premium in foreign greenfield investments is similar to the overall 
effect of foreign ownership on wages while the foreign acquisition premium is well 
below the greenfield estimates. To be precise, greenfield investors pay about 11 percent 
higher wages than domestically-owned Swedish firms, 5 percent higher than Swedish 
MNEs, and 12 percent higher than Swedish locally-owned firms. The corresponding 
numbers for acquisitions are 7, 2, and 8 percent. Hence, the wage effect of foreign   18 
takeovers  is  about  50  percent  to  two  third  as  high  as  the  effect  of  greenfield 
investments.
19 
We  have  also  estimated  firm-fixed  effect  models  to  take  into  account 
unobservable effects. Including firm fixed-effects further reduces the coefficient for 
foreign  takeover  to  1-2  percent,  depending  on  specification.  Comparing  foreign 
takeovers with Swedish multinationals give rise to a non-significant effect (see column 
6).  Again,  this  stresses  the  importance  in  separating  domestic  multinationals  and 
domestic local firms. 
 
Individual-level Analysis 
As discussed above, an analysis at the individual level rather than at the firm level is 
suitable when studying the effect of ownership on wages, since it can handle individual 
heterogeneity. Note also that by estimating individual level regressions we escape wage 
effects caused by changes in the labor force composition. This could arise if foreign 
firms replace less productive (low wage) workers with more productive (high-wage) 
workers. In Table 4 we present results from individual wage estimations.  
 
      -Table 4 about here- 
 
One striking result is that the estimated wage premium in foreign owned firms is 
substantially reduced when we change from firm level to individual level estimations. 
To be precise, estimation 1 in Table 4 shows that the unconditional wage premium is 
                                                            
19 One reason for observing higher wages in foreign greenfield investments than in foreign takeovers 
could be a difference in the experience of the employees. However, controlling for the age of the firms 
did not have any significant impact on the results (not shown).    19 
around 4 percent but the premium decreases to about 2.6 percent after inclusion of 
worker  characteristics  and  to  2.5  percent  after  inclusion  of  both  worker  and  firm 
characteristics.
20 Corresponding figures from the firm level analysis were 20, 11 and 11 
percent.  Moreover,  there  is  no  difference  in  wages  between  employees  in  foreign-
owned  firms  and  in  domestically-owned  multinational  firms.  Hence,  our  previous 
conclusion remains: multinationality is more important for wages than the nationality of 
the firm.
21  
As previously mentioned, we have a survival criterion on firms in the individual 
level analysis. To eliminate the impact of job switching on wages we have also imposed 
a no firm switching restriction on individuals. One might argue that these restrictions 
lead to a selection of firms and workers with certain properties that affect the results. In 
estimation 6 we therefore re-estimate estimation 3, relaxing the restrictions on firm 
survival  and  job  switching.  Relaxing  these  restriction  increases  the  number  of 
observations  by  more  than  300  percent:  from  1.6  million  observations  to  almost  5 
million observations. The impact on the foreign wage premium is relatively modest 
with a decline from 2.5 to 2.0 percent.
22 Comparing descriptive statistics in Table A2 
and Table A3 indicate that relaxing the restrictions brings many small firms in to the 
data, which might explain some of the increased wage premium. 
In estimation 7 we aggregate data back to the firm level and re-run estimation 4 
(full model) of Table 2 but on the same set of observations as in the individual-level 
                                                            
20 Expanding the number of industry dummies to 50 do not affect the results (not shown). 
21 Lipsey (2004) argues that the comparison of foreign- and domestically owned MNEs might be biased 
since the latter group includes headquarter services, with comparable high wages. It is likely that at least 
some of this bias is controlled for by our detailed information on worker characteristics. 
22 The foreign wage premium was -0.003 and 0.041 for Swedish owned MNEs and Swedish local firms, 
respectively (not shown).   20 
regressions. This operation allows us to analyze how the different samples (matched 
data  vs.  only  firm  data)  affect  the  results.  Changing  the  sample  pushes  down  the 
estimated foreign ownership wage premium from 10.5 percent to 7.4 percent, which 
remains high above the individual level estimate of 2.5 percent.
23 Again, the imposed 
restrictions excludes mostly small firms, which might explain why the wage premium 
estimated at the firm level in Table 4, model 7, is lower than the firm level estimate 
found in model 4 of Table 2. 
The results above suggest that firm size and weighting of observations matters 
for the results. It also underlines the importance of individual level data and to control 
for individual level heterogeneity. By taking individual heterogeneity into account the 
estimated foreign ownership wage premium almost vanish.
24 
The other estimated coefficients in Table 4 suggest that female wages are about 
14 percent lower than male wages and that blue-collar workers have about 11 percent 
lower wages than white-collar workers. Moreover, wages and experience follow the 
classical  inverted  U-shaped  pattern.  Regarding  firm  characteristics,  it  is  seen  that 
capital intensity and the average skill level of workers has an economically significant 
effect on wages.
25 Moreover, size and profits per employee are statistically significant 
but with small coefficients.  
                                                            
23 See also Table A2 where it is shown how aggregation affects data. Aggregation has an impact on the 
figures but it seems to be relatively modest.  
24 See Blundell and Stoker (2005), who discuss how aggregation affects data.  
25 The average skill level of employees aims at capturing complementarities with individual wages: 
individual wages might be positively correlated with the share of high skilled workers in the firms 
through externalities.   21 
Finally,  we have re-estimated all equations, controlling for within-firm error 
correlations, to take into account that observations might be correlated within firms. 
This did not upset the significance of our results.
26    
   
Individual wages, mergers and acquisitions 
In  the  previous  section  we  analyzed  differences  between  foreign-  and  domestically 
owned firms. If there is a positive effect of foreign ownership on wages received by 
individual workers, we expect this to show up in an analysis of foreign acquisitions. 
However, we would not expect any effect of foreign acquisitions if it is unobserved 
attributes of the workers that cause their higher wages.  
Moreover, foreign acquisitions may be non-random. For instance, high wage 
firms  may  be  acquired  more  frequently  than  low  wage  firms.  This  suggests,  as 
previously discussed, that matching techniques may improve the estimates.  Table 5 
presents results on both our matched and unmatched sample.  
 
      -Table 5 about here- 
 
Results from models 1 and 2 in Table  5 suggest a  foreign  ownership wage 
premium  in  acquired  firms  comparable  with  individual  level  estimates  previously 
obtained for the whole stock of foreign owned firms. Columns 4-6 present results from 
the matched sample of firms. Taking selection bias into account, the estimated impact 
of foreign ownership almost disappears, indicating that for individual workers there is 
no foreign wage premium. 
                                                            
26 Results are available on request.   22 
However, the wage premium may also be affected by unobservables. In models 
3 and 6 we control for unobservables by  estimating individual fixed-effect models. 
Since we have restricted the sample to workers remaining in the same firm the entire 
period  of  observation  of  the  firm,  we  obtain  within  individual  and  within  firm 
estimates. This means that we control for both time invariant individual- and firm-
specific effects, thus accounting for a systematic sorting of individuals across firms.  
The inclusion of fixed-effects has a large impact on the foreign ownership wage 
premium.  This  is  especially  true  for  the  unmatched  sample  where  the  fixed-effect 
estimation  reduces  the  wage  premium  from  two  to  minus  four  percent.  Finally,  in 
column 6 we estimate a fixed-effect model on our matched sample, taking into account 
both unobservables and selection bias. The results show a foreign acquisition wage 
premium of minus two percent.  
To see whether it is nationality or change of ownership that drives the results we 
also looked at previously foreign-owned Swedish firms that become Swedish owned. 
Estimating the same full model specification as in column 2, Table 5, the estimated 
impact  of  becoming  Swedish  owned  is  slightly  negative  in  all  estimations.  This 
suggests that the impact of foreign and domestic acquisitions differs only marginally.
27 
To visualize how wages evolve after an acquisition we depict wage trajectories 
for acquired and non-acquired firms (see Figure 1).  
 
      -Figure 1 about here- 
 
                                                            
27 Results are available on request.   23 
Figure 1 indicates that foreign owners target high-wage firms and that the wage 
actually decreases (increases but at a lower rate) after the change of ownership. This is 
seen by converging wage trajectories of acquired and non-acquired firms.
28 
We now proceed to study wage dynamics for individuals in acquired and non-
acquired  firms  by  means  of  combining  matching  and  difference-in-difference 
techniques. Blundell and Costa Dias (2000) show that such approach may improve non-
experimental evaluation results significantly. As described previously, the purpose of 
the matching procedure is to take into account the endogeneity of foreign acquisitions 
and possible selection bias. Combining matching with difference-in-difference analysis 
allows us to follow the wage dynamics over time, comparing wage growth between 
acquired and non-acquired control firms.
29 
Results from the difference-in-difference regressions are presented in Table 6. 
The growth rate of wages in targeted firms one respectively two years after acquisition 
is compared to the year prior to acquisition.
30 
 
      -Table 6 about here- 
 
Results  confirm  the  picture  given  in  Figure  2:  the  wage  level  is  higher  in 
acquired firms than in the group of matched non-acquired firms, and the wage growth 
                                                            
28 Acquisitions at time t occur in 1997 or 1998. Wages in non-acquired firms at time t is defined as 
average wages in non-acquired firms for the period 1997-1998. For subsequent periods we calculate a 
moving average. 
29 We have also run difference-in-difference estimations at the firm level on a matched sample of firms. 
The results, available upon request, are in accordance with the individual level results shown below. 
 
30 These effects refer to (t+1) –  (t-1) and (t+2) –  (t-1) in Table 6.   24 
in  acquired  firms  is  lower  than  in  firms  that  do  not  become  foreign  owned.  More 
specifically, the variable Foreign captures the wage difference between individuals in 
firms  that  are  taken  over  by  foreign  owners  and  individuals  in  firms  that  remain 
domestically owned. The coefficients suggest that individuals in takeovers have a wage 
level that is about 2-6 percent higher than individuals in other firms. However, the wage 
growth is  higher  in non-takeovers, as seen from  the  variable  foreign takeover.  The 
estimated coefficient, examining both the effect t+1 and t+2, suggests that wages grow 
slower for individuals in firms taken over by foreign owners compared to wages for 
individuals in other firms. This effect is stronger after two years than after one year 
(compare  columns  3  and  6)  perhaps  indicating  that  restructuring  of  the  firm  and 
negotiation of new contracts is a gradual process.  
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
We have examined the effect of ownership on wages. More precisely, we have used a 
large matched employer-employee data set to address the question of whether foreign-
owned firms pay higher wages than domestically owned firms and whether foreign-
owned firms pay higher wages for identical workers? The first question can without any 
doubt  be  answered  positively:  foreign-owned  firms  pay  higher  wages  than 
domestically-owned firms. However, there is no evidence that foreign firms pay higher 
wages for identical workers. Instead, higher wages in foreign-owned firms are caused 
by differences in firm and worker characteristics.  
Moreover, the results suggest that the difference between multinational and non-
multinational  firms,  rather  than  between  domestic-  and  foreign-owned  firms,  is 
important. Foreign-owned firms  tend  to pay higher wages than domestically-owned   25 
firms without foreign affiliates, but do not pay higher wages than domestically-owned 
multinational firms.  
We also find a large difference in results between firm-level and individual-
level data. Firm level results tend to overestimate the wage premium in foreign-owned 
firms.  Weighting  suggest  that  part  of  the  overestimation  is  caused  by  foreign-  and 
domestically-owned firms being distributed differently over size categories.  
Changing the unit of observation to wages at the individual-level makes the 
foreign  ownership  wage  premium  almost  disappear.  The  foreign  ownership  wage 
premium is then only two percent and the difference between foreign and Swedish 
owned MNEs is almost zero.  
To deal with unobservable factors driving foreign acquisitions and (unobserved) 
individual heterogeneity, we analyze takeovers, combining matching techniques with 
difference-in-differences  estimations.  The  results  suggest  that  foreign  owners  target 
high-wage firms and that, compared to non-targeted firms, wages increase at a lower 
rate after the change in ownership. Hence, for an individual worker, if anything, foreign 
acquisition implies a reduced wage growth. 
Our  results  have  some  important  implications.  Firstly,  previous  firm-level 
studies on ownership and wages presumably exaggerate the foreign wage premium. 
Secondly, the main  difference is not  between Swedish and foreign  owned firm but 
rather between MNEs and local firms. Thirdly, our results show that when using firm 
level  data,  it  might  be  desirable  to  consider  employment  weighted  regression 
techniques. Finally, worker heterogeneity and selection bias in foreign acquisitions are 
important issues to consider for properly determine the size of the foreign ownership 
wage premium. Controlling for these factors result in no systematic wage differences 
between employees in domestic and foreign-owned firms.    26 
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Tables and Figures   
 









  1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000 
Total  1.18  1.21  2.02  1.72  1.28  1.59 
Simple manufacturing (1)     1.04  1.21  2.12  1.70  1.30  3.52 
Wood and metals         (2)  1.10  1.12  2.49  1.77  2.38  2.11 
Electronics,transp. eq. (3)  1.19  0.85  2.94  1.58  1.95  1.28 
Energy                         (4)  1.13  1.04  2.19  1.42  1.76  0.96 
Retail trade                  (5)  1.34  1.43  4.27  3.12  1.04  1.31 
Transport services       (6)  1.08  1.16  1.37  3.01  0.70  1.31 
Real estate                   (7)  1.08  1.25  0.88  1.10  0.86  2.01 
Note: Share of skilled employees is constructed as the share of employees with at least 
tertiary education. 
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Table 2. The effect of foreign ownership on wages. Firm-level estimates 1990-2000 (dependent variable – log wage per employee) 
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Notes: Robust standard errors within brackets (.). *, **, *** - significant at the one five and ten percent level respectively. Industry dummies correspond to 14 industries. 
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    Table 3. The effect of greenfields and foreign takeovers on wages. Firm-level estimates 1990-2000 (dependent variable – log wage per employee).   
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Note: Robust standard errors within brackets (.). * - significant at a ten percent level; ** - significant at a five percent level; *** - significant at a one percent level. Firm characteristics 
include profits per employee, log firm size, capital intensity, employee skill dummies and the share of women at the firm. Industry dummies correspond to 14 industries. R
2 in the 
fixed-effects estimations are within figures. 
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Table 4. The effect of foreign ownership on wages. Individual level estimates 1996-2000 (dependent variable – log full time equivalent monthly wage). 
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Notes: Robust standard errors within brackets (.). * , **, *** corresponds significance at the one, five and ten  percent significance level. Industry dummies correspond to 14 
industries. 
A Dependent variable - average firm-level wage (FS).   32 
Table 5. Wage effects of foreign takeovers of Swedish firms. Individual level                
estimates 1996-2000 (dependent variable – log full time equivalent monthly wage). 
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Note: Robust standard errors within brackets (.). * - significant at a ten percent level; ** - significant at 
a five percent level; *** - significant at a one percent level. Individual and firm characteristics 
correspond to the same set of controls as in Table 3. In the fixed-effects estimations (columns 3 and 6) 
only time-varying variables are included. Industry dummies correspond to 14 industries. R
2 in the 





Figure 1. Wage growth for individuals in firms that are acquired by a 





















   33 
Table 6. Wage effects of foreign takeovers of Swedish firms – difference in difference         
        estimations on the matched sample 1996-2000 (dependent variable – log monthly wage). 
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Note: Robust standard errors within brackets (.). * - significant at a ten percent level; ** - significant at 
a  five  percent  level;  ***  -  significant  at  a  one  percent  level.  Individual  and  firm  characteristics 
correspond  to the  same  set  of controls  as in Tables  3  and  4. Industry  dummies  correspond to  14 
industries. (t+1) – (t-1) refers to the difference between one year after foreign takeover compared to 
one year prior to takeover. (t+2) – (t-1) corresponds to the effect two years after foreign takeover. 
  
Appendix 
Table A1. Variables. 
Firm variables    Source 
Wage  Average wage per employee, incl. payroll tax, 1990 year prices.  FS 
Profits  Profits, net of financial deduction, 1990 year prices.  FS 
Capital Intensity  Capital stock per employee, 1990 year prices.  FS 
Export share  (Export/sales)*100.  FS 
Labor productivity  Sales per employee, 1990 year prices  FS 
High Skilled  Share of labor force with at least 3 years post-sec. education.  RAMS 
Medium skilled  Share of labor force with 1-2 years of upper sec. education.  RAMS 
Low Skilled  Share of labor force with at most 9 years elementary education.  RAMS 
Foreign ownership  Dummy=1 if > 50 percent of a firm’s votes is foreign owned.  FS 
Size  Number of employees.  FS 
Female-share  Share of female employees.  RAMS 
Individual variables     
Wage  Full time equivalent monthly wage, 1990 year prices.  LS 
Female  Dummy = 1 if female.  LS 
Blue-collar  Dummy = 1 if blue-collar worker.  LS 
Education dummies 
(Based on the 
Swedish edu. 
nomenclature) 
(1). Elementary school < 9 years 
(3). Upper secondary, 2 years 
(5). Upper secondary, 4 years 
(7). PhD. 
(2). Compulsory school = 9 y.  
(4). Upper secondary, 3 years  
(6). Undergraduate studies, 3 y.  
  
LS 
Experience  Age minus number of years of schooling - seven.  LS 






























2 ,  
FS 
Note: Abbreviations:  Financial statistics (FS), Regional labor market statistics (RAMS), Individual 
wage statistics (LS).   34 
Table A2. Descriptive statistics, linked firm-worker data (1996-2000). 


















Monthly average wage  15.9   15.6   17.3   16.8  17.2   17.4 
Elementary School <9  0.11   0.14  0.10   0.14     0.12   0.11 
Compulsory School =9  0.13   0.15  0.12   0.15  0.14   0.14 
Upper Secondary School <3  0.38   0.37  0.37   0.34  0.33   0.34 
 Upper Secondary School =3  0.16   0.16  0.17   0.16  0.18   0.19 
Upper Secondary School =4  0.13   0.10  0.13   0.11  0.12   0.13 
University undergraduate  0.08   0.07  0.10   0.09  0.09   0.09 
University graduate  0.01   0.00  0.01   0.00  0.01   0.00 
Experience  26.2   25.2  23.7   24.7  25.0   24.4 
Age of employees  44.3   43.1  42.0   42.6  43.1   42.5 
Share female  0.42   0.33    0.27  0.26  0.30     0.32 
Share blue collar  0.39  0.50  0.47  0.52  0.51  0.45 
Firm characteristics             
Wage incl. soc.  24.0   22.9  26.4   24.8  26.4   26.3 
Firm size  8 117   372  7 334   945  1 499   573 
Export ratio  8.46   6.95  48.8   42.1  39.6   33.1 
Share women  0.42   0.33  0.28   0.28  0.31   0.32 
Share of high-educated  0.24   0.19  0.26   0.21  0.24   0.24 
Share of med-educated  0.54   0.53  0.53   0.51  0.51   0.52 
Share of low-educated  0.22   0.27  0.21   0.28  0.25   0.24 
log capital intensity  0.66   0.63  1.01   0.67  0.89   0.60 
Profits per employee  1.57   1.08  2.81   1.97  1.34   1.08 
Sales per employee  15.4   15.8  22.8   17.3  18.0   21.9 
Herfindahl index  2.41   5.82  1.81   3.90  2.68   3.54 
No  of observations  743 952  3 567  542 011  1 031  296 960  1 010 
 
Firm level statistics - not restricted by being linked to individual worker data. 




1990-2000  1996-2000 
Wage incl soc  20.3   22.1  23.3   24.6  26.0   27.9  
Firm size  115   98  443   405  214   208    
Export ratio  3.48   3.47  39.6   39.1  20.6   21.3 
Share women  0.30  0.31  0.28  0.27  0.31  0.31 
Share of high-educated  0.15   0.16  0.20   0.21  0.26   0.27 
Share of med-educated  0.54   0.56  0.51   0.53  0.51   0.52  
Share of low-educated  0.31   0.28  0.29   0.26  0.23   0.21   
log capital intensity  0.09   0.07  0.37   0.39  0.18   0.23   
Profits per employee  0.87   0.83  1.30   1.53  1.04   1.09   
Sales per employee  16.4   16.9        18.8   20.  28.2   31.2   
Herfindahl index  297   285  296   287     245   243    
No of obs.  46 965  28 100  5 733  3 482  7 921  4 769 
Notes : Firm level statistics on workers education stem from the data reported by the firm. Data on 
individual workers’ education stem from individual register data on education. Wages are in 1,000 
Swedish Kronor. Share female is based on individual level data. Share women is firm averages as 
reported by firms. Firm level wage data include social costs which vary over time and across firms, 
typically social cost increases wage cost by a factor of 1.45.  Restrictions on job switching and firm 
survival are imposed. 
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Table A3. Descriptive statistics. No restrictions on firm survival, job switching and worker 
survival. 
Firm level data 1900-2000. Individual level data 1996-2000.  

















Monthly average wage  15.3   -  17.0   -  16.4    - 
Elementary School <9  0.10   -  0.09   -  0.10    - 
Compulsory School =9  0.13   -  0.12   -  0.14    - 
Upper Secondary School <3  0.36   -  0.33   -  0.32    - 
 Upper Secondary School =3  0.27   -  0.29   -  0.30    - 
Upper Secondary School =4  0.05   -  0.04   -  0.04    - 
University undergraduate  0.08   -  0.11   -  0.10    - 
University graduate  0.00   -  0.00   -  0.01    - 
Experience  23.2   -  22.1   -  21.8    - 
Age of employees  42.3   -  40.4   -  39.8    - 
Share female  0.39  -  0.28  -  0.30  - 
Share blue collar  0.47  -  0.50  -  0.53  - 
Firm characteristics             
Wage incl. soc.    -  20.9  -  23.5     -     25.9 
Firm size  5 944        95     6 013  399  1 979         193 
Export ratio  10.9          2.43  53.1   38.3  40.0   17.8 
Share women  0.39          0.33  0.29  0.29  0.30   0.32 
Share of high-educated  0.11      0.08  0.15  0.11  0.13   0.14 
Share of med-educated  0.63          0.60  0.60  0.58  0.60  0.61 
Share of low-educated  0.26          0.31  0.25  0.31  0.27  0.25 
log capital intensity  0.25          -0.05  0.95  0.32  0.46  0.22 
Profits per employee  3.32          0.73  2.65  1.18  1.77  0.09 
Sales per employee  5.76          2.61  2.63  19.3  4.57  27.0 
Herfindahl index  6.27          428  4.12  500  2.68  424 
No of observations  2 049 588  79 255  1 193 187  7 371  991 126  12 476 
Notes : Firm level statistics on workers education stem from the data reported by the firm. Data on 




Table A4. Propensity Score matching. 1:st step logit. Dependent variable, Foreign ownership. 
    1997  1998 
Profits/sales 
Log firm size 
Log firm age 
Log capital per employee 
Low skilled 
Log labor productivity 
Export share 
Industry dummies 























Note: Robust standard errors within brackets. * - significant at a 10 percent level; ** - significant at a 
five percent level; *** - significant at a one percent level. All explanatory variables are lagged one 
year. The 1997 specification also include an insignificant effect of logged investment over sales. See 
Section III for information on how the matching procedure was implemented. 